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The monetary policy transmission mechanism under 
financial dollarisation: the case of Peru 1996–2006 
Renzo Rossini and Marco Vega
1 
1. Introduction 
This paper surveys the monetary policy transmission mechanism in Peru. The survey covers 
the most recent empirical papers dealing with the measurement of monetary policy. From the 
onset we stress that the last ten years have witnessed important changes in monetary policy 
procedures that led to the adoption of the inflation targeting (IT) framework in 2002. 
From the policy perspective, it is important to know the empirics of the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism, yet the nature of this mechanism is complex. And it is more so in a 
financially dollarised economy. The degree of financial dollarisation in Peru is still high 
(around 65 per cent of private credit is denominated in dollars). The high degree of financial 
dollarisation is key to understanding the transmission mechanism. One important element of 
the mechanism is the non-linear nature of the balance-sheet effect coming from currency-
induced credit risk in the financial system. 
The measurement and identification of the deep mechanisms at work in the transmission 
channel is difficult because monetary policy, as well as the environment surrounding it, has 
been evolving rapidly. So, uncertainty about the dynamics of the transmission mechanism is 
an important element the Central Bank of Peru has to deal with. Accordingly, this paper also 
performs exercises aiming to show the likely effects of central bank policy actions on the 
nature of the transmission and the way financial dollarisation reduces the monetary policy 
power to affect inflation. To the practice of monetary policy in a partially dollarised economy, 
the exercises imply that central bank actions have to be even more pre-emptive with regard 
to future inflation pressures and more watchful of potential balance-sheet vulnerabilities. 
2. Monetary  policy  evolution in recent years 
During the disinflation period (1991–2001), monetary policy in Peru followed a monetary 
targeting scheme without any commitment to an exchange rate or interest rate level. As 
mentioned in Rossini (2001), the sizeable degree of asset dollarisation and the high 
frequency nature of external shocks
2 were key reasons for adopting a managed floating 
exchange rate regime, whereas the existing high rates of inflation motivated the monetary 
targeting framework.  
The process of disinflation turned out to be gradual (Table 1) not only because central bank 
credibility recovered slowly but also because of the initial high degree of relative price 
distortions. Nonetheless, gradualism allowed the real costs associated with the process to be 
minimised, and by 1997 inflation reached single-digit levels. 
                                                  
1   Central Bank of Peru. The opinions herein belong to the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the 
Central Bank of Peru. 
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During the disinflation period, the Central Bank of Peru made several changes in its 
monetary policy design and instruments, creating the conditions for moving to a fully-fledged 
inflation targeting regime in 2002. 
For instance, when inflation rates reached levels lower than 20 per cent, real demand for 
domestic currency started growing fast, and for the first time, communication problems about 
money base targeting arose. In that context, beginning in 1994 monetary policy management 
improved through announcements of end-of-year inflation targets. 
Regarding monetary instruments, at the beginning of the nineties there was a lack of both 
public and private liquid assets in domestic currency, and therefore forex intervention was 
the main way to control base money growth. To foster an effective interbank market and the 
needed monetary regulation in domestic currency, the first step was the removal of high 
reserve requirements on domestic currency deposits (1991–1993) from an average rate of 
40 to 9 per cent. This was followed by the issuance of Certificates of Deposit
3 to allow for 
contractionary monetary operations (1994) and finally repo operations with the banking 
system to provide temporary liquidity (1997).
4  
Once inflation narrowed to international levels and monetary base growth became more 
difficult to predict as well as less correlated with inflation, the monetary targeting scheme 
proved to be no longer satisfactory. Moreover, a new policy challenge appeared in 2001 in the 
form of deflationary pressures, which had not been recorded in Peru during the last 70 years 
and posed a serious threat to the Bank’s recently gained credibility. 
                                                  
3   These are instruments issued by the Central Bank of Peru itself. 
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At first, the central bank dealt with such new conditions with a change in the operational 
target. In 2000, monetary base growth was replaced by a quantitative target: the banking 
reserves at the central bank. In essence, however, the use of this instrument still relied on 
the short-run relationship between monetary aggregates and inflation, which explains its 
abandonment two years later. 
In this context, the problem of how to run an expansionary monetary policy without losing 
credibility in a financially dollarised framework was finally tackled by the central bank with the 
adoption of inflation targeting in 2002. As described in Armas and Grippa (2006), the 
characteristics of Peruvian IT are largely similar to those in other countries that have 
managed to reach and preserve a low inflation rate, consistent with their long-run inflation 
target level.
5  
With the IT regime, the short-term (interbank) interest rate was introduced as the operational 
target instead of the monetary aggregate. Figure 1 summarises the evolution of the 
operational target in recent years. 
Figure 1 
Evolution of the operational target 
 
The advantages of the current operational target are detailed in Armas and Grippa (2006). 
These are summarised in four ideas: first, the interbank rate communicates the monetary 
policy stance clearly; second, this rate is a benchmark for other interest rates denominated in 
domestic currency;
6 third, the volatility of the interbank interest rate has decreased and the 
interest rate pass-through has strengthened (Lahura, 2005); and finally, it is flexible enough 
to allow quick and large increases in the interbank interest rate during extreme situations, to 
limit currency depreciation and prevent balance-sheet effects from undermining economic 
activity and the solvency of the financial system. 
                                                  
5   Inflation targeting in Peru hinges on the central bank commitment to keep inflation on target. From 2002 to 
2006, the target was 2.5 per cent with a tolerance margin of +/– 1 per cent. From 2007 onwards, the target is 
2.0 per cent with a tolerance margin of +/– 1 percent. 
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3.  The existing empirical evidence 
A decade ago, De la Rocha (1998) presented a first general overview about the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy in Peru. That view relied on three channels: money, credit 
and the exchange rate. In those years, the influence that the central bank exerted over 
monetary aggregates was regarded as the most important channel. This was the primary 
reason for using the monetary base growth as intermediate target even until 2000 (see 
Figure 1). 
De la Rocha (1998) suggests the existence of uncertainty surrounding credit channel 
effectiveness after the structural changes faced by the Peruvian economy during the 
nineties. He contrasts factors reducing the effectiveness against others improving it.
7 On the 
other hand, it seems that the main concern about the exchange rate channel was the 
balance-sheet effect rather than the direct pass-through to prices. In that context, the role for 
central bank intervention as a means for taming exchange rate volatility was highlighted.  
Empirical research assessing the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in Peru came 
to light in the second half of the nineties. Early papers highlighted the use of monetary 
aggregates as the instrument of monetary policy. More recent research, reflecting the 
change in operating procedures at the central bank, started focusing on the interest rate as 
the preferred instrument variable. 
We divide the current discussion on the transmission mechanisms, studying the interest rate 
and exchange rate channels, the expectations channel, the credit channel and, given the 
existing financial dollarisation, we also look into vulnerability issues constraining monetary 
policy. 
3.1  Interest rates and exchange rate channels 
Recent VAR evidence on the transmission mechanism is provided in Winkelried (2004), 
Grippa (2004), Bigio and Salas (2006) and Leiderman (2005). Winkelried (2004) finds rather 
short and simultaneous responses of both GDP and inflation to an interest rate shock (less 
than a year). In contrast, Grippa (2004), following a structural identification approach, finds 
longer monetary policy lags (the peak response of output was in about 18 months after the 
shock while prices achieve the larger change only three years after). 
From the policy perspective, the above two results regarding the transmission lag prove its 
uncertain nature. In fact, the evolving feature of monetary policy operating procedures over 
the sample period
8 hampers empirical estimations. The functioning of the transmission 
mechanism has surely also been changing as the direct influence of the continuous 
improvement of the monetary policy design, its transparency and communication, not to 
mention the increasing sophistication of financial markets and financial globalisation. 
Therefore, VAR models that try to extrapolate past behaviour onto an ever-changing 
environment have only limited scope. Yet, there are no other sensible alternatives available. 
One of the elements of the complexity of the transmission mechanism is the non-linear feature 
of the transmission. Non-linearities are documented in Bigio and Salas (2006), who find that 
contractionary monetary policy shocks have a stronger effect on output during recessions than 
                                                  
7   Higher capital mobility and the development of the domestic capital market are considered as factors reducing 
the credit channel effectiveness, whereas restoration of confidence in the banking system and higher bank 
intermediation tend to increase the effectiveness of this channel. 
8   Due to the short sub-sample periods, in-depth empirical analysis cannot be performed. BIS Papers No 35  399
 
 
during booms, suggesting the existence of a convex supply curve. In the exercises they 
perform, monetary policy affects output in about a year and prices in about 16 months. 
All in all, as the monetary policy design evolved to suit the developments in the economy, the 
supporting empirical literature shifted in the same fashion. In the process, the literature finds 
some evidence that the interest rate channel has become stronger. This is probably the 
result of the increasing importance of the interest rate as a monetary policy signal and the 
expanding capital markets within the longer-term maturity spectrum.
9 Moreover, as is typical 
in small open economies, when the interest rate channel becomes relatively more relevant 
than the pass-through channel, then the transmission lags turn out to be longer. 
However, the above development in the interest rate channel can be potentially dampened 
by financial dollarisation. As we consider in Section 4, financial dollarisation implies that 
exchange rate depreciations are contractionary. In this case, the monetary policy power to 
affect prices via the standard domestic demand channel weakens.
10 
The pass-through from exchange rates to inflation 
We now turn our attention to the pass-through from exchange rates to inflation. Many authors 
suggest the exchange rate pass-through ought to be larger in a dollarised economy than in 
non-dollarised countries. Importantly, if the pass-through were indeed large, this would 
heighten the power of monetary policy to affect inflation through the exchange rate channel. 
However, we shall bear in mind two developments regarding the pass-through in Peru and 
elsewhere: 
(i)  There is now a body of research that supports a declining pass-through in 
developed as well as developing economies.
11 
(ii)  The pass-through of exchange rates to domestic prices depends on invoicing 
practices. Incomplete pass-through characterises developing economies because 
invoicing of imported goods is made in domestic currency (pricing to market). In 
Peru, high inflation in the past probably favoured heavy invoicing dollarisation even 
at the retail level; so when inflation faded, the pass-through also fell. Furthermore, 
the central bank fostered the introduction of legal measures geared to induce 
invoicing in domestic currency at the retailer level.
12 As a result, invoicing 
dollarisation has decreased substantially. 
Therefore it is no surprise that empirical papers dealing with estimating exchange rate pass-
through to prices have found low pass-through levels. For example, Quispe (2001) finds that 
a 1 per cent depreciation of the exchange rate produces 0.12 per cent of extra inflation. 
More recent empirical explorations by Miller (2004) and Winkelried (2004) come up with 
similar results: a 1 per cent shock on the exchange rate has an effect on CPI inflation in the 
                                                  
9   See Armas and Grippa (2006) for a detailed account of the development of the local government bond market 
in domestic currency. See also Lahura (2005) for estimations of the pass-through of short-term to longer-term 
interest rates. 
10   Another factor that might explain the general weakening of the domestic demand channel in the world is trade 
globalisation. This is, for example, the idea put forward in Vega and Winkelried (2005) and Borio and Filardo 
(2006). 
11   In particular, Edwards (2006) finds that those countries that adopted the IT regime had a stronger reduction in 
their pass-through coefficients. On the other hand, Frankel et al (2005) find that pass-through reduction in 
developed countries was even faster than observed in developing countries. 
12   In 2004 a law was enacted to induce price advertising in domestic currency. So, even though dollar 
advertising was not forbidden, price tagging in soles must also be included. 400  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
range of 0.1 to 0.2 per cent within a year.
13 These estimations were recently updated and 
compared to those of Deutsche Bank (2006), which used a similar method for a group of 
Latin American countries. The updated pass-through was even lower than 0.1, below the 
mean pass-through for Latin America but higher than those for Colombia and Chile. 
This last result is also compatible with the estimations in Leiderman et al (2006), who 
perform empirical research using VARS. The paper finds the pass-through in Peru was 






ology  Sample Main  results 
Bringas and Tuesta 
(1997) 
VAR  1991:4–1995:5 –  Excess reserves are good indicators of 
monetary policy. Credit channel is weak. 
León (1999)  VAR  1991:6–1998:6 –  An innovation to currency in circulation has 
effects on inflation within 4 to 14 months 
after the innovation. 
–  No money aggregate is identified with 
significant effects on output. 
Quispe (2000)  VAR  1991:1–1998:6 –  Liability dollarisation does not affect the 
power of monetary policy. 
–  A shock in base money has significant 
effects on inflation within 8 and 16 months 
after the shock. 
Winkelried (2004)  VECM  1993:1–2003:4 –  Results support the existence of interest 
rate channel as a possible mechanism of 
action for monetary policy. 
Grippa (2004)  VAR  1994:2–2004:2 –  The interbank interest rate appears as a 
reasonable estimation for the appropriate 
indicator of policy stance. 





1994:1–2004:7 –  Interest rate shocks have asymmetric 
effects: during boom periods, interest rate 
increases have more effects than interest 
rate decreases. 
Leiderman (2006)  VAR  1993:1–2005:7 –  Higher pass-through in Peru than in Chile. 
 
3.2  The expectations channel 
There has not been empirical research measuring the expectations channel so far. This has 
been due to the lack of long-term inflation expectations data. The longest extant sample 
relies on mean private forecast surveys produced by Consensus Economics, which delivers 
                                                  
13  Winkelried (2003) finds a non-linear effect whereby the same shock to the exchange rate during a boom 
period will hit inflation in about 30 per cent. BIS Papers No 35  401
 
 
monthly average responses about the year-on-year inflation expected for current and next 
calendar years. Using these data and tracking the realised inflation within a year, a time 
series of one-year-ahead inflation expectations can be calculated. In this subsection, this 
document presents some preliminary estimation that supports how the expectations channel 
might have become stronger. 
Figure 2 
One-year-ahead inflation expectations and inflation targets 
 
Figure 2 depicts the inflation expectations series. These inflationary expectations can be 
compared with the inflation target to see how close or far apart they are from each other. It is 
important to note that until 2001 and since 1994, the central bank announced a desired 
inflation range for each year.
14 The circles in every December denote the middle values of 
those ranges. The values for the other months are obtained by simple interpolation, as seen 
in Figure 2. The target of 2.5 per cent is considered from December 2002 onwards. 
From expectation models, it is plausible to consider that the expectation series above vary in 
time due to changing information and to how private forecasters process information. 
Forecasters tend to use the announced target as information to form longer-term 
expectations while they tend to use current information (eg the recently observed inflation 
evolution) to form shorter-term expectations. 
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t,t+12 is the 12-month-ahead expectation of inflation taken at time t, π
target
t+12 is the 
inflation target committed to be achieved 12 months ahead, πt–1 is the inflation observed one 
period before expectations are formed and αt is the weight attached to the target when 
inflation expectations are formed. This coefficient can be interpreted as the credibility of the 
central bank on its commitment to achieve the target in the future. 
The evolution of the credibility coefficient was estimated through recursive regressions. The 
results are depicted in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 
Credibility coefficients using recursive OLS regressions 
 
During this period, the credibility parameter grows from values close to 0.8 at the end of the 
nineties to values that are closer to 1.0 in the inflation targeting period. This result points to 
the increasing anchoring of expectations by the central bank. This in turn favours the 
expectations channel. The importance of this finding is that, through this channel, changes in 
nominal interest rates induced by the central bank deliver nearly proportional changes in real 
interest rates (given that inflation expectations at medium to longer horizons are anchored by 
the target). Thus monetary policy becomes more powerful. 
3.3  The credit channel 
The evidence about the strength of this channel is weak for Peru. There have been two 
opposing forces behind this channel. First, higher capital mobility and domestic capital 
market developments have increased the available substitutes for bank credit such us 
financing through debt or equity in the capital markets. This has reduced the effectiveness of 
the credit channel. On the contrary, with increasing confidence in the banking system, higher 
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The most recent empirical evidence on the importance of the credit channel relies on panel 
data at the firm level. Table 3 summarises the evidence; the bottom line is that the credit 
channel has not been relevant for monetary policy.
15 Even though the growth of private 
sector credit contributed to the expansionary phase observed in the period 1994–97, this 
occurred because large banks had sizeable credit lines with foreign banks. The posterior 
credit contraction (after the Asian crisis) is explained, first, by a decline of lending capacity 






Studies Methodology  Results 
Bringas and Tuesta 
(1997) 
VAR  –  Liquidity effect prevails. Higher influence over 
monetary liabilities than credit levels. 
Quispe (2001)  VAR  –  Central bank has limited power to reduce the credit 
supply through financing reduction in domestic 
currency of banks. 




–  Evidence of credit rationing in Peru, caused by a 
lower disposition to provide it. 
Berróspide and Dorich 
(2002) 
Panel data  –  Differentiated effects by bank type. Evidence of 
credit restriction only in larger banks. 
Loo-Kung and Shiva 
(2003) 
Panel data  –  On average, monetary policy is not able to affect 
the overall supply of bank lending. 
–  Evidence of lending channel in local currency in 
small banks. 
–  Differentiated effects by bank size. Monetary policy 
has less power over larger banks. 
 
3.4  Vulnerable balance sheets and their effect on monetary policy 
One essential issue in a financially dollarised economy is the aggregate vulnerability of 
balance sheets resulting from sharp exchange rate depreciations
17 attributable, for example, 
to a sudden stop of capital inflows. This imposes a trade-off for policy makers between 
exchange rate flexibility and financial stability. In the short run policy makers should be 
cautious and cannot afford to neglect exchange rates movements. However, in the long run, 
they should recognize that in order to de-dollarise the economy, it is necessary to allow 
exchange rate flexibility. 
                                                  
15  Moreover, within the past few years new alternative sources of finance have been developed, particularly 
bonds and commercial paper, thus reducing the direct credit channel effect. 
16  For the case of Peru, Barajas and Steiner (2001) find that the credit contraction observed during the crisis 
years was due mainly to the reduction of credit supply resulting from credit rationing. This occurred despite the 
fact that lending capacity recovered and demand for credit was strong. 
17  In extreme cases of financial fragility, sizeable unexpected exchange rate depreciations against the dollar 
increase the burden of dollar-denominated debts, weakening balance sheets and increasing the risks of 
financial distress. 404  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
The practice of monetary policy in emerging markets has indeed been shaped by the 
dilemma imposed by financial fragility. This is, for example, outlined in Amato and Gerlach 
(2002), which points out that on the path towards fully-fledged IT, many countries kept 
exchange rate targets and only slowly abandoned them. In fact, abandonment of exchange 
rate targets has usually not been undertaken until measures to mitigate financial vulnerability 
have been put in place. 
The IT framework in Peru has included these elements of risk control within its special 
monetary policy design to foster financial stability.
18 However, like any risk mitigation 
approach, the Peruvian framework has been put in place without knowing the full extent of 
the balance-sheet effect, let alone its existence. 
Empirical research has tackled the issue through two approaches: using micro panel data at 
the firm level and estimating aggregate macroeconomic data. The overall conclusions we 
can derive from the studies are twofold. First, the evidence on whether exchange rate 
depreciations are contractionary or expansionary is not conclusive. Second, exchange rate 





Studies Methodology  Results 
Carranza et al (2003)  Panel  –  Overall contractionary effects. 
Jimenez (2005)  Panel  –  Firms’ indebtedness with banks is sensitive to 
exchange rate shocks. Smaller banks are more 
vulnerable. 
Azabache (2006)  Panel  –  Non-linear effects on loan portfolio of banks. 
Castillo and Dorich (2005)  Panel  –  Weak balance-sheet effect at the firm level, but 
important at the macro level. 
Bigio and Salas (2006)  VAR  –  Evidence of asymmetric contractionary real 
depreciation on output. 
Leiderman (2006)  VAR  –  Evidence of Granger causality from real bilateral 
exchange rate to nonperforming loans. 
 
4. Dealing  with  uncertainty  about exchange rate effects 
The Central Bank of Peru adopted inflation targeting as a monetary policy framework in early 
2002, thus becoming the only highly financially dollarised economy to become an ITer. As 
such, the design and implementation of IT therefore needs to pay special attention to the 
possible balance sheet consequences of currency mismatches and the potential run on 
dollar deposits in the banking system. The risks associated with sudden and sharp currency 
                                                  
18   In Armas and Grippa (2005), the risk control framework includes a series of measures besides the 
managed-floating approach to inflation targeting. BIS Papers No 35  405
 
 
depreciations are not negligible. Therefore, the central bank takes a prudential approach to 
control these risks.
19  
The core quarterly forecasting model (QFM) relies on a simple structure that tries to capture 
the main findings about the transmission mechanism laid in the empirical survey of the 
previous section. Namely, it models the interest rate as well as the exchange rate and 
expectation channels. 
Figure 4 
The monetary policy transmission mechanism 
implied in the QFM structure 
 
The mechanism depicted in Figure 4 resembles the standard monetary policy transmission 
theory in small open economies. In particular, we have stressed channels (1), (2), (3) and 
(4): the inflation expectations channel, the interest rate channel through aggregate demand, 
the pass-through from exchange rates to inflation, and exchange rate expectations channel, 
respectively. These channels behave in the same fashion as any other small open economy 
model, though financial dollarisation might have a bearing on the specific empirical 
sensitivities of endogenous variables within each of these channels. 
Importantly, a financially dollarised economy imposes extra channels through which 
monetary policy can affect aggregate demand and inflation. Of course, financial 
vulnerabilities coming from sudden stops and exchange rate market distortions also spread 
through these channels with the potential to affect macroeconomic outcomes. These 
“vulnerability mechanisms” are labelled as (5) and (6) in the picture. Channel (5) represents 
the way long-run exchange rate expectations affect the real interest rate on dollar loanable 
funds to domestic borrowers. Furthermore, the cost of dollar loans for domestic borrowers is 
determined by the long-term foreign real interest rate plus the real depreciation rate. Lastly, 
channel (6) is the net real exchange rate impact on activity originated from balance-sheet as 
well as net export effects. 
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Empirical sensitivities at the aggregate level within these three channels are harder to 
identify. The empirical approaches at the firm level surveyed in this paper provide some 
rationale for the importance of exchange rate concerns in endogenous monetary policy 
reactions. However, the overall prudential approach taken by the central bank might have 
dampened latent and potential adverse effects in the recent past. Therefore, reduced form 
econometric exercises remain uncertain. So, what is urgent in the central bank research 
agenda is the structural estimation of deep parameters and the study of robust analysis to 
overcome the uncertainties regarding exchange rate effects. 
In what follows we perform simple exercises taking into account the potential uncertainties 
that are embedded in the QFM. To do this, Table 5 presents the main equation blocks of the 
model
20 describing the mechanism depicted in Figure 4. 
Table 5 
Equations in the Quarterly Forecasting Model (QFM) 
for the Peruvian economy 
Aggregate demand 
,, ,
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Monetary policy 
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At first sight, the model is a standard small open economy model in the New Keynesian 
tradition. The first block contains the output gap as a function of one-year real interest rates 
and real exchange rates plus exogenous factors embedded in ζy,t. 
                                                  
20   A thorough exposition of the model can be found in Central Bank of Peru (2005). BIS Papers No 35  407
 
 
Note that besides the domestic one-year real interest rate, the corresponding real dollar 
interest rate also plays a role in this equation. As long as the economy remains dollarised, a 
fraction of non-tradable producing agents will take dollar loans. Due to market segmentation, 
agents (without market power) cannot arbitrage when differences in expected costs among 
currencies arise. The relevant real rate of these loans is determined by equation (1.5), which 
measures the cost for agents with incomes in soles but liabilities in dollars. Here long-run 
exchange rate expectations have a direct impact on these real rates. 
We can also note the presence of the bilateral exchange rate depreciation (through the 
term aqb) together with the effective real exchange rate (through the term aq). If aqb were 
higher than aq then, at the aggregate level, the balance-sheet effect channel would 
overshadow the net-export channel, as Carranza et al (2004) suggest. 
The inflation block is also close to standard modelling practice. It considers the imported 
inflation effect (πm) and the lagged output gap (y
gap) as well as inertial, expectations and 
exogenous supply factors. However, one issue that can arise is the strength of the pass-
through in a dollarised economy. Given the estimations presented in Miller (2003), Winkelried 
(2003) and Leiderman (2006), the pass-through (the combined effects of parameters bm and 
αm) in the model is rather small. 
The short-run exchange rate block is worthy of attention. It is normally expected that a rise in 
interest rates would have an appreciatory impact on the nominal spot exchange rate. This 
behaviour can be modelled by an uncovered interest parity relationship. However, most 
standard models assume the next-period exchange rate expectations are rational, which 
means the spot rate is indeed determined by the entire profile of interest rate differentials 
expected in the future. This fact makes the spot exchange rate a jumpy variable, which is 
compatible with a pure-floating exchange rate regime. However, exchange rate interventions 
by the central bank limit the volatility of the spot rate as viewed at the relevant quarterly 
frequencies. One way to introduce the impact of interventions is to introduce adaptive or 
inertial exchange rate expectations, as we do in equation (3.2). The more acute the 
intervention behaviour is, the less volatile the exchange rate becomes, so the inertial 
parameter cs functions as a proxy of the degree of exchange rate interventions.
21 
Last, the monetary policy rule block is standard as well. The behaviour of the central bank is 
determined by an inflation-forecast targeting rule common in most central bank models. 
Given this model structure, we perform two exercises dealing with uncertainty about the 
exchange rate effects. In our first exercise, we condition the model to extreme values of the 
cs parameter; thus we in fact model how the behaviour of the transmission mechanism would 
change due to shift from lower to higher exchange rate intervention activities. In the second 
exercise we control for possible balance-sheet effects by trying different values for the real 
exchange parameters in the demand equation. 
4.1  The role of foreign exchange market interventions 
The central bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market to smooth undue fluctuations. 
Without intervention, any bubble-like behaviour would not be sustainable anyhow, and the 
market would correct deviations from equilibrium. However, the transition to equilibrium could 
nevertheless endanger financial markets in a dollarised economy. Along these lines, Morón 
and Winkelried (2005) suggest that it is optimal to dampen exchange rate fluctuations in a 
dollarised economy like Peru. 
                                                  
21  The higher cs is, the more inertial (and less volatile) the exchange rate is. Bofinger and Wollmershäuser 
(2003) explore another approach to model intervention. In their model, interventions affect the exchange rate 
premium so as to lean against the wind whenever good or bad news threatens to move the premium. 408  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
However, intervention policy faces a trade-off. On the one hand, excessive intervention could 
sustain dollarisation in the long run, as people do not internalise the risks of dollarisation, 
providing safe returns to dollar deposits and low costs to dollar debts. But on the other hand, 
episodes of excessive volatility (associated, for example, with a large and abrupt 
depreciation) would have a negative effect in the short run, affecting economic activity due to 
balance sheet vulnerabilities. 
Thus, one direct and observable outcome of central bank intervention is the low variability of 
exchange rates. We use the QFM to simulate alternative degrees of intervention by moving 
the parameter cs from 0 (no intervention) to a value equal to 1 (very strong intervention that 
makes exchange rates very smooth). 
Figure 5 
Responses to a 100 basis point rise in the interest rate 
when the exchange rate expectations parameters change 
 
Figure 5 shows the response of the four main variables in the model. The solid line 
represents the high-exchange-rate volatility model whereas the discontinuous line stands for 
the low-exchange-rate volatility model. A monetary policy shock that implies a higher interest 
rate makes the domestic currency denominated bonds more attractive, causing a nominal 
exchange rate appreciation. The model implies that if the exchange rate were allowed to float 
more (by means of less intervention), the inflationary effect of exchange rate appreciation 
would be quicker but smaller. In contrast, more intervention implies a long lasting and 
stronger pass-through effect on inflation. Leiderman et al (2006) propose the hypothesis 
regarding a higher pass-through in dollarised economies. To fine-tune the hypothesis, given BIS Papers No 35  409
 
 
the simulation result, it may well be the case that higher pass-through results from central 
bank intervention activities rather than dollarisation per se.
22 
Regarding economic activity, the interest rate rise seems to have a stronger effect under the 
high-exchange-rate volatility model. This effect is the direct result of the net-exports effect 
embedded in the model. In reality, it may well be the case that the positive net-exports effect 
dominates only for small exchange rate movements, whereas the balance-sheet effect 
dominates whenever larger exchange rate shocks hit the economy. This potential non-linear 
effect is not modelled here. 
4.2  The balance-sheet effect 
How does the presence of the balance-sheet effect impinge on monetary policy’s power to 
affect inflation? In Figure 6 we depict responses to an interest rate move to reduce the 
inflation rate. The exercises show again two possible cases. In the first case, the net-export 
effect dominates (the parameter aq in equation (1.1) is set to 0.20, while the parameter abq is 
0.14). The results are depicted in the solid line. In the second case, the parameter aq is 
lowered to 0.05, which means that the balance-sheet effect dominates. 
Figure 6 
Responses to a 100 basis point rise in the interest rate 
under possible parameterisation of balance-sheet 
and net export effect on aggregate demand 
 
                                                  
22   Successful interventions to smooth out volatility precisely deliver better information about where the exchange 
rate is heading. This information may serve price setters to pass-through more of the exchange rate’s slow 
movements over the cycle. 410  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
In a standard open economy model, we would observe an appreciation of the currency and a 
fall in the output gap due to the real exchange appreciation, both effects thus reinforcing 
each other in equilibrium. In the modelling framework presented here, the above effects not 
necessarily reinforce each other. They may even offset each other and thereby weaken the 
monetary policy transmission channel. 
As expected, under the balance-sheet model (discontinuous line) monetary policy’s power is 
reduced due to the expansionary effect produced by the exchange rate appreciation. We 
observe that the output gap remains above zero for about a year after the contractionary 
interest rate move. So, taking into account the nominal exchange rate appreciation and the 
expansionary result in output, inflation still falls, but only timidly and in a long-lasting way. 
5. Conclusions 
We have performed an empirical survey with the following main findings: 
•  There is mixed evidence about the monetary policy transmission lags in Peru. There 
is, however, a hint of longer lags due to the use of the interest rate as the operating 
target. 
•  The pass-through channel from exchange rates to inflation is rather small, about 
10 per cent within a year. These results are in line with other findings for Peru and 
elsewhere. 
•  The evidence about the credit channel is less convincing, but recent rapid 
de-dollarisation should help to reinforce it in the future. 
•  There is uncertainty about the balance-sheet effect because the evidence is not 
conclusive. If the effect indeed exists, it is likely to be non-linear and asymmetric. 
Macroeconomic time series analysis of this effect is hindered by the lack of enough 
controls. 
•  Lower financial dollarisation will reinforce the interest rate channel of monetary 
policy. 
•  A simple econometric test with expectation surveys suggests that the expectations 
channel has strengthened during these last years. 
Financial dollarisation has two overall effects on monetary policy. First, it calls for an 
appropriate design of IT to control the inherent risks surrounding a dollarised environment. 
Second, it makes monetary policy less effective whenever the balance-sheet effect is strong. 
Importantly, the transmission mechanism is endogenous to the particular monetary policy 
design put in place; for example, the degree of foreign exchange rate intervention changes 
the timing and strength of the pass-through mechanism. Namely, a lower degree of 
intervention makes the pass-through quicker but lower. 
On the other hand, when the balance-sheet effect dominates over the net-export effect in the 
aggregate demand determination, a contractionary monetary policy expands output in the 
first year, and only after that time, the net-export effect appears. Regarding inflation 
determination, the resulting higher demand tends to offset the downward pressure coming 
from the exchange rate appreciation, delivering a small inflationary effect. 
The interest rate channel seems to be effective in Peru because dollarisation is not of the 
currency substitution type. Central Bank of Peru estimates have shown that an increase in 
interest rates tends to feed through the banking overnight interest rate to the longer-term 
market interest rates and finally have an impact on aggregate demand and inflation. BIS Papers No 35  411
 
 
Additionally, a reduction in financial dollarisation would reinforce this channel as well as the 
credit transmission mechanism.  
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